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 34PRESIDENT’S MESSAGE
More than two years after 
it officially ended, the 
Great Recession still casts 
a long shadow. Although 
the economy has been 
growing, the pace of the 
recovery has been pain-
fully slow, and reaching 
a full recovery is going 
to take far longer than 
most people had expected. The country is just now returning to 
the output levels we reached before the recession began in late 
2007 —and that has not been enough growth to put Americans 
back to work at the levels we desire. Many of us have family 
members or friends who are still contending with the impact  
of a job loss or a financial hardship. However, despite this  
discouraging pace, I firmly believe that eventually we will 
make a full economic recovery. American businesses and their 
employees have a long track record of adapting to meet the 
evolving needs of the economy.
Against that backdrop, a question that we at the Federal Reserve 
Bank of Cleveland have been thinking about is whether this 
experience has changed us—and what it might mean for the 
country going forward. More specifically, we are wondering 
whether this recession will induce any long-lasting adjustments 
in economic behavior, such as the spending, saving, and work 
decisions for an entire generation of people. Most people alive 
today have no memory of the Great Depression, and the latest 
recession has no recent comparison. 
Mainstream media has already dubbed those Americans who are 
living through the Great Recession as “Generation Recession.” 
In this special issue of Forefront, we examine the most critical 
trends that—if enduring—will have great significance to that 
generation and to our economy going forward. For example, 
people have been spending less and saving more: How long 
will that dynamic persist, and will it hinder the recovery or help 
long-term growth? Participation in the labor force is shrinking: 
How many people over the age of 50 who lose a job will decide 
it is futile to search for new work, and if so, what further strain will  
those decisions put on our nation’s already fragile social safety 
net? Newly minted college graduates can’t find work matching 
their training: Will that alter how people view the value of a 
college education, to the detriment of the long-run path of skill 
building and innovation in this country?
It is too soon to make the call on whether the behaviors currently  
being exhibited will be a lasting fixture of the American economy,  
but in culling out the critical issues, we hope to better evaluate 
the economic implications.
A useful perspective on these issues comes from economic  
historian Price Fishback, whom we interviewed for this issue of  
Forefront. As a scholar of the Great Depression, Fishback reminds  
us that America has been through much worse than the recent 
recession and bounced back considerably stronger than before.
As an economic policymaker, I can assure you that the Federal 
Reserve will do all it can to move us past the Great Recession 
once and for all. Most recently, we have indicated that economic  
conditions are likely to warrant keeping the federal funds rate—
our short-term policy interest rate—low until at least mid-
2013. We have also announced plans to alter the composition 
of our asset holdings to put even more downward pressure on 
longer-term interest rates. Low interest rates can help persuade 
businesses to invest and consumers to spend. In turn, those 
activities should lead firms to pick up the pace of their hiring.  
It is my strong belief that these and accompanying policy efforts 
are playing an important role in promoting a full economic 
recovery, in a context of price stability.  ■
Sandra Pianalto 
President and Chief Executive Officer 
Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland
    1 refront FPop quiz: Where are consumers  
more likely to use their smartphones 
for making payments at the checkout  
aisle—the United States or Kenya?
Surprise! It’s Kenya, but that may 
change as U.S. financial services 
providers catch up with the rest of 
the world.
The concept of mobile payments  
is new enough to require some  
explanation. First, there’s a differ-
ence between mobile payments and 
mobile banking.
Mobile banking services allow you 
to do things like monitor account 
balances, transfer funds, and receive 
alerts—pretty much anything you 
can do with a web browser from your 
computer. Mobile payments, on the 
other hand, let your smartphone 
double as a debit or credit card.
Although they still sound like the 
stuff of science fiction to many 
Americans, mobile payments may 
be commonplace sooner than most 
people think. Just as ATMs took off 
and paper checks all but vanished, 
mobile payments could spread like 
wildfire. It’s partly a matter of getting 
the infrastructure and operating 
agreements in place. For its part,  
the Federal Reserve is working to 
ensure that when mobile payments 
do arrive en masse, they will operate 
in an environment as safe and secure 
as other payment channels.
nt Upfr
Toward  
Mobile Payments  
Just two years ago, the Federal 
Reserve—led by the Atlanta and 
Boston Reserve Banks—convened  
a working group to share knowledge 
about mobile payments and banking 
developments in the United States. 
The idea was to organize a meeting  
of industry stakeholders in the 
emerging mobile financial services 
industry and discuss some of the  
barriers to U.S. adoption of the  
mobile channel.    
Clearly, U.S. mobile banking services 
were gaining traction. Banks large 
and small quickly recognized the 
need to add value and convenience 
to their products and compete 
with banks already offering mobile 
services. 
But U.S. mobile payments services  
weren’t yet catching on. For example,  
one form, the mobile proximity  
payment, remains a rare transaction  
in the U.S. It enables you to use a 
mobile handset at the merchant’s 
point-of-sale terminal to purchase 
goods and services. In effect, the 
mobile phone substitutes for swiping 
a credit or debit card through the 
card slot on the terminal. The buyer 
simply waves the phone in front of 
a device at the pay station. Once 
the payment information from the 
phone enters the device, it rides the 
same payment rails as a debit or 
credit card.   
A few developing countries have 
been the real hotbed of mobile  
payments. In those nations where 
people tend to rely on basic mecha-
nisms of exchange, such as cash,  
mobile telephony has enabled  
consumers to leapfrog a generation  
of payment instruments like checks 
and credit cards. They use their  
mobile phones as a substitute for 
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Dan Littman  
Economist 
Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland
Cindy Merritt  
Assistant Director, 
Retail Payments Risk Forum 
Federal Reserve Bank of AtlantaMore on mobile payments
Follow the latest developments from  
the Federal Reserve’s Mobile Payments 
Industry Workgroup at www.bostonfed.org/
bankinfo/firo and at http://portalsandrails.
frbatlanta.org, the Atlanta Fed’s payments 
and mobile initiatives blog, Portals and 
Rails.
bank branches and ATMs, which 
don’t exist in most rural areas. By  
doing so, they achieve a more secure,  
accessible banking and payments 
environment than was possible 
before. Kenya and South Africa are 
among the countries where mobile 
payments are drawing previously 
unbanked people into the modern 
banking system.  
But why not here in America? We 
already have advanced payments 
systems, which are safe and secure 
and complicate the business case 
for mobile payments. Moreover, so 
many players are involved here that 
coordination is difficult. That’s not 
true in many emerging countries, 
where a single telecom provider may 
serve the entire nation, and there 
may be only a handful of banks.  
A Change in the Landscape
Still, a number of new payment  
service rollouts and trials are  
emerging in the United States.  
Telecom carriers, banks, and technol-
ogy service providers are partnering 
in new ventures to offer mobile wallet 
applications by Google, PayPal, 
and Isis. On the person-to-person 
payments front—in which parents, 
for example, can pay babysitters 
through their mobile phones—three 
of the nation’s largest banks have  
announced a payment transfer 
service that will enable customers 
to move money from their checking 
accounts by using either an email 
address or a phone number.  
In August, Visa announced its 
intention to encourage chip tech-
nology for credit card payments. 
That means cards will be equipped 
with microchips that can be read by 
point-of-sale devices, replacing the 
magnetic stripe technology now 
used by most merchants. The next 
generation of point-of-sale devices 
will accommodate chip-embedded 
cards as well as mobile phone  
payments.  
So where does the Federal Reserve 
fit in? Broadly speaking, the Fed’s 
role is to help ensure that the U.S. 
mobile payments system is safe and 
secure. With consumers adopting 
mobile payments, the Fed has an 
interest in keeping the system as 
efficient and orderly as before while 
providing access to as many users as 
possible. 
What Next?
Ubiquitous mobile payments are not 
only possible but almost inevitable. 
As the landscape changes, the 
industry is moving to create a secure, 
interoperable, and universal channel 
for mobile payments. Many questions  
remain as handset and chip manu-
facturers, telecom companies, card 
networks, financial institutions, and 
Check balances, view transactions
View other accounts
Move funds between accounts 
Check balances, view transactions (credit card)
Pay bills
ATM/branch locator
Move funds between financial institutions
Move funds between customers at  
same financial institution
Move funds between customers at  
different financial institutions
Mobile remote deposit capture
Bilingual mobile website or app
Enroll using mobile phone
Open accounts from mobile phone
Mobile contactless payments
Mobile Banking and Mobile Payments in the U.S.
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software providers all try to get a 
foothold in mobile payments. Some 
of the questions are smaller—how 
will consumers know who to call 
when they encounter a problem? 
Some are larger—how exactly will  
the different players come together 
to smoothly handle mobile payments  
through electronic channels? The 
Federal Reserve’s Mobile Payments 
Industry Workgroup continues to sort 
through challenges like these.  ■
Although mobile banking services are widely offered by the largest financial institutions in  
the United States, the percent offering mobile payments services remains low.
Sources: Javelin Strategy and Research; Federal Reserve Bank of Boston.
0%
0%
    3 refront FMany people commonly use the term “Great Recession” 
to describe the 18-month downturn that ended two years 
ago, as if it is somehow equivalent to the Great Depression  
era. In fact, the Great Depression consisted of two separate  
recessions, punctuated by an expansion from 1934 to 1936.  
The cumulative loss of output during the decade between 
1929 and 1939 was on the order of 20 percent, a far cry 
from anything we have experienced since. 
The recession officially dated from December 2007 to 
June 2009 was neither as long nor as steep as the recession  
of 1929–33, let alone the entire Great Depression. Never-
theless, the analogy between the Great Depression and 
current experience continues to resonate. Perhaps it is 
because the severity of unemployment already surpasses 
any episode our country has experienced since the Great 
Depression. Or perhaps it is because the collapse of housing  
prices and the magnitude of home foreclosures exceed all  
records since the Great Depression. Or perhaps it is because  
nothing else has shaken the public’s confidence in the 
economy since the Great Depression. 
How the Recession 
May Change America
Mark S. Sniderman 
Executive Vice President 
and Chief Policy Officer
GENERATI N
RECESSI N
 4 Fall 2011The evolution of the Great Depression should serve as  
a grim reminder that much remains unknown about the 
ultimate footprint that the Great Recession will have on  
the nation.
There are many differences between today’s economy  
and that of the 1930s, some of which are the direct legacy 
of that tragedy. We have a much stronger social safety net 
in place now than when the Great Depression started. 
And today’s economic policymakers responded quickly 
and forcefully to counteract the recent downturn. 
Yet, the evolution of the Great Depression should serve 
as a grim reminder that much remains unknown about 
the ultimate footprint that the Great Recession will have 
on the nation. At this point, we simply don’t know what 
choices people will make in response. Among the many 
aspects of economic life that could be affected are labor 
force participation, housing choices, personal saving, the 
financial system, the scale of government, and monetary 
policy. What we do know is that these choices are important  
to monitor. How they develop could determine just how 
“great” this most recent recession really turns out to be.
The Variables 
Labor force participation has declined considerably since 
the onset of the financial crisis, led by 25- to 54-year-olds. 
Clearly, many have become discouraged about their ability  
to find an acceptable job. Many of those who remain in the  
labor force but are unemployed have had to contend with 
extremely long spells of joblessness or underemployment. 
During the Great Depression, many breadwinners suffered  
several years of unemployment, and families endured 
considerable hardships. In response, many states and the 
federal government expanded their social safety nets: 
Unemployment insurance, social security, and aid to 
families with children received increased public support 
and funding. The federal government directly created jobs 
through several large-scale programs such as the Works 
Progress Administration. Labor union membership grew 
steadily for decades.
From a personal perspective, how will the Great Recession  
shape our perspective of what constitutes “a good job”? 
What strategies will individuals adopt to better prepare 
themselves for the unpredictability of working life? From 
society’s perspective, what happens to the skills of those 
who endure the hardship of long-term unemployment 
or underemployment—are there cost-effective ways to 
reduce the deterioration in knowledge and skills that 
could result? What strategies could be adopted to smooth 
the transition back into productive work and to reduce 
dependence on the social safety net?
It goes without saying that the housing market was the 
epicenter of the financial crisis, and its malfunctioning 
remains one of the key obstacles to a sustainable recovery.  
During the Great Depression, depressed housing values 
and “underwater” homeowners were also barriers. One 
significant difference between then and now is that our  
modern financial system turned ordinary home mortgages  
into highly complex and securitized financial instruments,  
making it much more difficult to coordinate a solution 
with all of the affected parties. Add to that the poor under-
writing standards underlying some of these mortgages, 
and it is easy to see why it has been a challenge to “put 
Humpty Dumpty together again.” 
    5 refront FThe housing market suffers from a lack of confidence  
on the parts of sellers, buyers, and lenders as to the “true 
value” of properties. Lenders have retreated from their 
very expansive view of what constitutes a “creditworthy 
borrower” and are rethinking how to price for the risk of a 
loan. Many foreclosed homeowners have been forced into 
becoming renters, and many potential homeowners are 
becoming renters either by choice or by necessity. 
From a personal perspective, how will the Great  
Recession affect the way in which people view a home as 
the “best investment they can make?” What other vehicles 
might rise to take the place of housing as an important 
household asset? From society’s perspective, should we 
continue to provide an allowance for home mortgage 
interest expenses in the tax code? Should we continue to 
support the owner-occupied mortgage market through 
government-sponsored enterprises? How might a  
permanent rise in demand for rental housing affect  
the development of neighborhoods and communities? 
What are the implications for the construction, real estate, 
and home-furnishing industries?
Saving and financial literacy in a post-recession world also 
deserve consideration. Although there is plenty of blame to  
go around, one of the contributing factors to the housing 
boom was the willingness of people to live beyond their 
means. Too many households saved too little, and they 
often borrowed against their homes to finance current 
consumption. Many American consumers did not under-
stand the financial products they were dealing with, either 
as mortgage borrowers or as investors. 
What does it mean to be financially literate? From a  
personal perspective, will the financial crisis convince 
people to save more? How many people will develop the 
habit of “paying themselves first” before spending the rest 
of their paychecks? Will people become more careful in 
their use of financial products, and more demanding of 
the financial institutions with which they do business? 
From society’s perspective, how much caveat emptor 
will we expect, and how much caveat venditor will we 
demand? The mortgage foreclosure crisis provides a 
powerful example of how society at large can benefit from 
better individual financial decision-making. 
For example, research at our Bank and by others shows 
that foreclosed homes depress the prices of neighboring 
homes that are not in foreclosure. We can gain a lot by 
finding more effective ways to educate people in their use 
of financial products, to incent saving, and to engage in 
even rudimentary financial planning. 
Government policy also bears scrutiny. Let’s start with  
fiscal policy. Deciding to put the federal budget on a  
sustainable path is not the same thing as deciding on  
the scale and scope of government. Arithmetically, there 
are many ways to make spending and taxes add up to 
the same number. Should we approach budget balance 
through more tax revenue, or through less spending? 
Which taxes and which spending? And don’t forget  
regulatory policies, which can also significantly affect 
resource allocation decisions made in the private sector. 
One significant difference between the Great Depression  
and now is that our modern financial system turned  
ordinary home mortgages into highly complex and  
securitized financial instruments.
 6 Fall 2011The size and scope of the federal government expanded 
considerably during and after the Great Depression.  
Although many economic historians have come to view 
this expansion as broadly supportive of both longer-term 
economic growth and stability, most economists recognize  
that there are limits to that process. The question is, have 
we reached or crossed that limit, or do we need to rely on  
the federal government once again for stability and growth? 
The debate rages on in our current political discourse. 
Another debate is under way about the role and conduct 
of monetary policy. The Federal Reserve (along with the 
central banks of several other countries) has taken many 
unusual steps to supply liquidity to financial markets, 
facilitate credit availability, and spur economic growth. 
These unusual steps have greatly increased the amount, 
nature, and maturity structure of the Federal Reserve’s  
assets, and they have also led to innovations in direct 
lending programs to financial institutions. Both the Federal  
Reserve’s ability to respond to the financial crisis in unusual  
ways, and its choice to do so, have been profoundly affected  
by the Great Depression. Consequently, there is an irony 
—one that parallels the questioning of expansionary 
fiscal policy—to the discord that has arisen over the use 
of the unusual policy tools. 
Uncertain Future 
During the Great Depression, people did not know it was 
the Great Depression. The Great Depression evolved and 
was characterized by episodes of expansion and subsequent 
relapse. How today’s economy progresses from this point 
is unclear. Confidence is low, and it’s susceptible to bouts 
of self-perpetuation. At the same time, we have the benefit 
of knowing that as a nation we not only recovered from a 
somewhat similar painful period, we prospered. 
What seems increasingly clear is that we are living through  
a historically fascinating period. The generation of people 
who are coping with economic problems today may well 
change the ways in which they think, and those changes 
may well change our economy. That could be something to  
worry about. But then again, it could also be something 
to look forward to.  ■
Both the Federal Reserve’s ability to respond to the  
financial crisis in unusual ways, and its choice to do so,  
have been profoundly affected by the Great Depression. 
More on financial literacy
Check out the Cleveland Fed’s Learning Center for resources on  
financial education at www.clevelandfed.org/learning_center
    7 refront FSurvey Says:
Consumer Attitudes May Hold the Key 
to a Sustained Recovery  
By almost any measure, American families are worse off today than they 
were before the recession. And they know it. 
Back in the golden days of 2006, many U.S. households—43 percent—
said they were better off than the year before, and 31 percent said they 
were worse off.
By 2010, a year after the Great Recession’s official end, those sentiments 
were flipped: Just 25 percent said they felt better off and 41 percent said 
worse.
Data analysis by Margaret Jacobson, Research Analyst 
Text by Doug Campbell, Editor
 8 Fall 2011These figures come from the Ohio 
State University’s (OSU) Consumer 
Finance Monthly survey. A team of  
surveyors, sponsored by the school’s 
Center for Human Resource Research,  
collects thousands of observations  
each year using a nationally represen-
tative sample. The results provide one  
of the best sources of information 
available on Americans’ attitudes 
about their financial situations. 
Those attitudes are particularly  
relevant right now. If this really was  
a “balance sheet recession,” as many 
have called it, then recovering from  
it will first and foremost require time,  
as consumers pay off their debts 
and build up their savings. But it 
may also require a shift in attitudes 
before consumer demand, not to 
mention expectations of future 
income growth, rebounds.
That’s because spending behaviors  
are likely to depend on how quickly 
households can rebuild their balance  
sheets and then feel confident about  
their future income prospects. House-
holds that describe themselves as 
worse off financially are more likely 
to need some time before stepping 
up their spending. 
We know that U.S. families in general  
experienced pretty rough times 
during the recession, and even after. 
Some people saw the values of their 
homes plummet. Some lost their 
jobs. Others lost wealth in the stock 
market. A look at the OSU survey 
data helps put into perspective the 
pervasiveness of household discon-
tent, shedding light on which groups 
suffered the most and which made  
it through relatively unscathed.
In summary, the survey tells us that 
household sentiments are tracking 
pretty closely with other economic 
data. For example, the decline in 
household attitudes recorded by 
the OSU survey seems to correlate 
strongly with the increase in the 
unemployment rate during the same 
period. That rate was 4.4 percent at 
the end of 2006; by the end of 2010, 
it was 9.4 percent.
These sentiments also help explain 
some of that same economic data, 
because depressed economic senti-
ments translate into depressed 
economic behavior.
Let’s take a closer look at our  
question—how are households 
doing compared with a year earlier—
with a little more precision. Does  
the malaise extend to all households 
or just to some of them?
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Sources: Center for Human Resource Research at the Ohio State University; Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland.
2006 2010
Would you say that you and your family are better or worse off financially than you were a year ago?
    9 refront FIn 2010, Americans across different 
income categories generally  
expressed more pessimism about 
their situations than they did before 
the recession. 
First consider the attitudes of those 
with very low incomes: 
The percentage of those feeling 
better off fell by 5 percentage points; 
the percentage of those feeling worse  
off stayed about the same. For  
perspective, almost 20 percent of 
U.S. households have incomes of  
less than $20,000. So the 45 percent 
who were feeling worse off in 2010 
represents about 8.5 percent of the 
total U.S. population—about one  
in 12 families.
The shift is even more evident 
among those with higher incomes:
The portion of those with incomes 
higher than $60,000 (representing 
about 40 percent of the U.S. popula-
tion) feeling better off fell by almost 
half, and the fraction of those feeling 
worse off increased by a third. 
What this may be telling us is the  
relatively wealthy felt their losses 
more keenly than the less wealthy. 
People in the higher-income 
categories were more likely to be 
homeowners and felt the plummet 
in property values more acutely.  
Or it may be saying that people with 
low-to-moderate incomes have it 
tough all around—the recession 
hurt, but did not markedly change 
their already bleak outlook. Overall, 
the impact on household outlook 
would certainly be enough to blunt 
spending, which in turn serves as a 
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2006: Incomes of More than $100,000
2006: Incomes of More than $60,000
2010: Incomes of More than $100,000
2010: Incomes of More than $60,000
Sources: Center for Human Resource Research at the Ohio State University; Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland.
The attitudes of the top 20 percent 
of the income distribution (those 
earning more than $100,000 a year) 
show that the pain of the recession 
was widespread. The fraction of top 
earners who said they were better 
off in 2010 fell by 24 percentage 
points compared with 2006, and 
the portion of those who said they 
were worse off grew by 9 percentage 
points. While those were dramatic 
changes, it’s worth noting that they 
still leave the highest-earning house-
holds feeling better than their lower-
earning counterparts who make less 
than $20,000 a year.
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Finally, we can break down house-
hold outlook by age group: 
The most pronounced shifts are 
clearest among younger house-
holds—those who probably didn’t 
have much in the way of assets to 
begin with, but might have been 
given expanded access to credit  
during the prior few years.
Younger people have really lowered 
their sights: The percentage of those 
feeling better off is almost a third 
lower than it was before the recession,  
and the ranks of “worse off” are up 
almost 50 percent. What’s really 
remarkable here is how many 18- to 
34-year-olds used to be full of  
youthful optimism; the recession 
really took the wind out of their sails. 
Job prospects continue to be dim for 
this cohort, college education or not 
(though it’s certainly better to have 
a college degree). The consequences 
of debt buildup might now be more 
evident.
The middle-aged, meanwhile, 
weren’t as optimistic as young  
Americans to begin with. But by 
2010, their pessimism actually  
exceeded the younger group’s. 
Those older than 60 didn’t alter their 
assessments quite as much as their 
younger cohorts, though more did 
say they were worse off and fewer 
said they were better. Given that the 
stock market had mostly rebounded 
by the end of 2010, retirees as a 
group probably were feeling about 
the same as they did before the 
recession. 
It’s probably safe to say that people’s attitudes about the current situation—as 
reflected in the Consumer Finance Monthly survey—feed into attitudes about 
the future. Consider the University of Michigan’s venerable Survey of Consumers. 
When Americans are asked how much they expect their incomes to grow over  
the next year, lately they are answering “not much.” It’s clear that people continue 
to have very low expectations of future income growth. A quick look at the 
responses across income distributions shows pretty much the same results— 
a wide cross section of Americans are pessimistic about their future incomes. 
The chart below summarizes the responses of all those surveyed.
To Most,  
the Future Also Looks Bleak
Expected Change in Family Income











Note: Shaded bars indicate periods of recession.
Source: University of Michigan, Survey of Consumers.Related Link
For more on the Ohio State University’s  




Watch a presentation based on the survey at 
www.clevelandfed.org/forefront/surveysays
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By the end of 2010, the recession  
had already been officially over for  
18 months. After any other recession, 
you would’ve expected that to be 
reflected in surveys like OSU’s  
Consumer Finance Monthly.  
But maybe the surveys tell us every-
thing we need to know: This was no 
ordinary recession.  ■
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Sources: Center for Human Resource Research at the Ohio State University; Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland.
Would you say that you and your family are better or worse off financially than you were a year ago?If unemployment is the single most important indicator 
of the job market’s health, the patient is unquestionably  
sick. According to the most recent data from the Bureau 
of Economic Analysis, total economic activity contracted  
by 5.1 percent during the recession;  as a result, unemploy-
ment jumped from 5 percent in December 2007 to  
10.1 percent by October 2009. Since then, unemployment  
has stabilized at around 9 percent, still an uncomfortably 
high rate. 
Typically, the unemployment rate increases whenever the 
overall economy undergoes a recession. The rate peaks  
about 15 months after the recession begins, or four months  
after it ends, then drops gradually as the economy recovers  
(see the first figure on page 15). Our current experience 
has been unusual on two counts. First, unemployment 
has risen much more than in other recent recessions; 
second, the unemployment rate has remained high for an 
exceptionally long time.
So the main labor market-related questions facing 
Generation Recession are these: Is high unemployment 
here to stay? If so, what does it mean for the millions of 
Americans who are out of work—not to mention the rest 
of American society? 
Unemployment  
and the Great Recession
Murat Tasci  
Research Economist
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Our work at the Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland shows  
that most of the increases in the unemployment rate 
results from cyclical factors; that is, factors that ordinarily 
would have only a temporary effect and should gradually 
fade as the economy recovers. That’s the good news. 
The bad news is that we also have found at least two reasons 
why the unemployment rate could stay high for some time: 
the weakness of the recovery in real economic output and 
the slow rate at which workers find new jobs. To understand  
these reasons, we need to take a closer look at how workers  
move into—and out of—unemployment.  
The unemployment rate reports the number of jobless 
workers as a fraction of the labor force. But in any given 
month, some employed workers lose their jobs and some 
unemployed workers find new ones; in this way, they flow 
into and out of the unemployment pool. Thus, the overall 
number provides scant information about the actual extent 
of churning in the labor market. Worker flows largely  
determine the unemployment rate, but the rate says 
nothing about them. 
Typically, the start of a recession is marked by an increase  
in layoffs and a decrease in hiring. As the economy begins  
to recover, layoffs usually stabilize just before the unemploy-
ment rate peaks. Most of the subsequent rise in unemploy-
ment results not from layoffs but from a low hiring rate.
In some ways, the recent recession was no exception;  
toward its end, layoffs stabilized. However, even two years 
into the recovery, unemployed Americans still have trouble  
finding work. To better understand when we might expect  
this situation to improve, my colleague Saeed Zaman and I  
developed a new measurement of the long-run unemploy-
ment rate that incorporates worker flows into the analysis. 
This helps us distinguish between two potentially different  
reasons for a high unemployment rate: long periods of 
unemployment for laid-off workers and the very high 
number of layoffs overall. Underlying trends in these flow 
rates determine where the unemployment rate will settle 
in the long run.  
When measured in this new way, the unemployment rate 
trend—commonly called the “natural rate”—has been 
relatively stable in the last decade, even after the most 
recent recession. This natural rate has hovered around  
6 percent for a few decades, and there it remains 
(see the second figure above).
How could the trend have changed so little when 
unemploy ment was so high? There are two reasons 
behind this outcome: First, the recent recession was a 
terrible recession, in terms of both duration and depth. 
Unemployment Rate during Recessions








Months from start of a recession
1980 1987
20 25 30 35 40
1994 2001 2008
Note: Dots indicate average length of unemployment period.
Source: U.S. Department of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics.
Note: Shaded bars indicate periods of recession.
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the job-finding rate started to decline over the past decade,  
and separations have been declining since the 1980s. 
What ever impact these trends would have had on the 
natural rate, therefore, have been offset. What emerges is 
a portrait of a job market where workers change employ-
ment status much less frequently than before. 
This is not a welcome development. In theory, the more 
labor market churning there is within an economy, the 
faster unemployment returns to its natural rate. Intuitively,  
we would expect that as more unemployed workers start 
finding jobs, unemployment would decline more quickly 
toward that rate. 
Our model generates an unambiguous conclusion:  
The low rate at which unemployed workers are finding 
jobs predicts a slower decline in the unemployment rate. 
In other words, it will take a long time, longer than it 
normally did, for unemployment to move back to around 
6 percent. 
Whether the labor market situation becomes better or 
worse depends primarily on the growth rate in the aggre-
gate economy. Our research provides a stark example of 
this potentially important factor. For instance, if real GDP 
growth had been 4.9 percent annually during the first  
Understandably, out-of-work Americans feel worse about their 
financial conditions than those with jobs.
Using data from the Ohio State University’s Consumer Finance 
Monthly’s survey and breaking it down by employed versus  
unemployed households, we reach predictable results. Compared 
to families with at least some employment, unemployed families 
are 16 percentage points more likely to say they are worse off 
than a year earlier. Unemployed households are less than half as 
likely as employed households to say they are “better off.”
It’s probably premature to draw broad conclusions from these 
results. One thing to watch, though, is whether we are witnessing 
a “two-speed” recovery, in which people with jobs aren’t feeling 
the after-effects of the recession at all, while the unemployed—
and in particular the long-term unemployed—are getting 
hammered.
—Doug Campbell, Editor
Households’ financial situation  
in 2010 compared with a year earlier 
Employed
Unemployed
Sources: Center for Human Resource Research at the Ohio State University; 
Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland.
Unemployed Feel Recession’s Sting
two years of the recovery (as was the case after the 1982  
recession), the unemployment rate would have come 
down to around 7 percent by now. Instead, growth was 
only 2.5 percent annually, leaving unemployment around 
9 percent.  
Long-run unemployment trends are important for  
under standing an economy’s productive potential. The 
longer we exceed the natural rate, the longer we waste our  
resources—in this case, human capital. For instance, almost  
half of the unemployed remain jobless for 27 weeks or  
longer; their odds of finding a job become further reduced  
as their skills decline and they lose professional contacts.  
Potentially, a large pool of long-term unemployed might 
start losing their skills to the point of being a bad match 
for new jobs when the economy finally starts to recover 
robustly. This is one particular danger the Great Recession 
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 16  Fall 2011The   Labor Force:
To Work or Not to Work
Daniel Hartley  
Research Economist
Will participation eventually recover, or did the recession 
permanently lower the fraction of Americans who will try 
to find work? We don’t know yet, but the importance of 
the answer underlines the reason economists pay attention 
to the labor force participation rate.
If capital and technology are held constant, an economy 
with fewer workers will generally produce less. However, 
capital and technology are not constant; they change over 
time. Furthermore, large numbers of people who do not 
participate in the labor force engage in other productive 
activities such as raising children, pursuing education,  
or taking time for leisure  
such as retirement. 
When we talk about the U.S. labor force, it’s important to 
know exactly what the term means. From a statistician’s 
standpoint, any civilian over the age of 16 who does not 
live in an institution can be counted as part of the labor 
force population. Of course, not everybody who can par-
ticipate does. Some parents might decide to stay at home 
to raise children. Some 20-somethings might decide to 
enroll in graduate school. Here is a simple calculation:  
  Labor force 
– Nonparticipants   population
          Labor force 
       =  participation rate
  Labor force population
Since the last recession began in December 2007, the 
participation rate has fallen about 2 percentage points. 
Interestingly, more than three-quarters of that drop has 
occurred since the recession officially ended in June 2009. 
In fact, an alternative measure of unemployment is as high 
as 16 percent right now when accounting for discouraged 
and marginally attached workers, plus those working part-
time for economic reasons. 
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Note: Shaded bars indicate periods of recession.
Sources: U.S. Department of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics.
Note: Shaded bars indicate periods of recession.
Sources: U.S. Department of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics.
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Participation in the United States, 2006.
2.     Social Security Administration, www.ssa.gov/OACT/STATS/dibStat.html.
They account for about an eighth of the overall drop of  
2 percentage points in the labor force participation rate—
significant, to be sure, but not enough to fully explain  
the drop.
Structural Changes 
In the longer view, the history of labor force participation 
may tell us something about the path ahead. One of the 
most striking long-run changes in the workforce has been 
the dramatic increase in the number of women who work 
for pay outside the home. Women’s share of the labor 
force moved from just above 40 percent in 1970 to a bit 
below 60 percent in 1990. In fact, it was largely because 
of women that the overall labor force participation rate 
climbed to historically high rates until about 2000. Since 
then, however, both men and women have been leaving 
the labor force with greater frequency.
As the bottom figure on the left shows, labor force partici-
pation paths for different age groups have diverged in recent  
years. Since 2000, the participation rate for people ages  
16 to 24 has fallen from 66 percent to about 55 percent. 
One explanation for this large drop is that more young 
people are enrolled in school: Between 2000 and 2005, 
the fraction of 16- to 24-year-olds pursuing an education 
grew from 53 percent to 57 percent.1 Observers are not 
sure whether this increase is a cause or an effect of the 
lower labor force participation rate. But over the long term,  
increased enrollment of young people could produce a 
more highly skilled workforce, which would boost future 
economic growth.
We have also seen a drop in labor force participation 
among the prime-age population (ages 25 to 54), from 
about 84 percent in mid-2000 to about 82 percent in 
mid-2011. About half of that decline has occurred since 
mid-2007. One contributing factor may be the relaxation  
of eligibility criteria for disability benefits: The net number  
of people added to the disability rolls from 2007 through 
2010 averaged about 350,000 per year.2 This could  
account for a drop of about 0.5 percentage point in the 
labor force participation rate from 2007 through 2010—
again, a significant amount, but not enough to explain the 
entire decline.
So how should we think about nonparticipants in the 
labor force? Economists seeking a useful barometer of 
economic well-being tend to focus on the people who 
would like to work but have given up looking. These 
“discouraged workers” are defined by the Bureau of Labor 
Statistics as those “not currently looking for work specifi-
cally because they believed no jobs were available for 
them or there were none for which they would qualify.” 
The fraction of the labor force composed of self-defined 
discouraged workers has risen from about 0.2 percent  
at the beginning of 2008 to about 0.45 percent now.  
18  Fall 2011While the young and middle-aged have been hopping  
out of the labor pool, older Americans have been hopping 
in. The participation rate of people 55 and up has been  
increasing since the mid-1990s (although it has pretty 
much flattened out since 2007). Some attribute this change  
to seniors’ improving health, which allows them to continue 
working later into life. Others maintain that the financial 
crisis may have adversely affected retirement accounts, 
causing older workers to delay retirement in order to 
rebuild their savings.
Older workers’ increased participation has not been 
enough to offset the falling participation rate of younger 
workers. Although the U.S. population is aging on average,  
the young and prime-age populations still make up almost 
70 percent of civilians over 16.
A Scarring Effect?
No matter how we try to explain the longer-run structural  
trends, a key question remains: Will the labor force partici-
pation rate return to its pre-recession path? Or will the 
recession and slow economic recovery leave a lasting scar 
on participation? 
It’s conceivable that workers who are discouraged now 
will find jobs when times are better. Or finding jobs could 
remain hard for them for a long time because their skills 
have deteriorated. 
Whether economic policy can make a difference depends 
on the diagnosis of the problem. The Congressional Budget  
Office estimates that in the long run, the expiration of the 
Bush-era tax cuts would cause a drop of almost a full per-
centage point in the labor force participation rate, but it is 
unclear how much this would affect discouraged workers. 
If the currently high level of discouraged workers results 
simply from low aggregate demand, then there is a role for 
monetary policy; however, if workers are leaving the labor 
force because their skills don’t meet employers’ long-run 
needs, then the appropriate policy response could be to 
provide education or re-training opportunities.  ■
The recent rise in the number of “discouraged 
workers” in the country is reflected in public 
surveys about the employment situation. 
A July 2011 Gallup survey included a question  
about the current job market: Thinking about  
the job situation in America today, would 
you say that it is now a good time or bad 
time to find a quality job?
Nine out of 10 respondents said that now is  
a bad time to look for work.
It is important to monitor the number of  
discouraged workers among us. As a society 
that prides itself on providing economic  
opportunity, we may have to ask ourselves 
how we would deal with a large, stable  
population of people who want to work but 
have given up hope of finding a job. 
Bottom line:  If you want to know whether  
the economy is getting better, a good place 
to start is the number of discouraged work-
ers. When it starts going down, the economy 
should really be moving up.
—Doug Campbell, Editor
Americans Skeptical about Finding Good Jobs
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Good timeOnce upon a time, Americans saved more than 10 percent 
of their incomes. Then the saving rate went south—fast. 
By 2005, it had dipped to nearly zero. Borrowing followed 
the opposite path: Total U.S. consumer credit outstanding 
clocked in at around $60 billion in 1960, jumped to  
$400 billion by 1980, then soared beyond $2.5 trillion  
by the early 2000s.1
Now, in the wake of the recession, the saving rate has 
ticked up again to around 5 percent. Debt levels, by  
contrast, have edged lower. The question of whether this is 
the “new normal” has large implications for the economy. 
According to what’s known as the Solow economic  
growth model—and depending on the saving rates of 
other economic sectors, such as business—just bumping 
the personal saving rate from 5 percent to 6 percent could 
increase income levels by 2 to 3 percent in the long run. 
“A difference in the saving rate of one or two percentage 
points is very important,” says Filippo Occhino, a senior 
research economist with the Federal Reserve Bank of 
Cleveland. 
But the recession was so deep, and climbing out of it is 
taking so long, that there are more questions than answers 
about where Americans’ saving behaviors will go from 
here. The variables abound.
People don’t save because it’s fun; they do it to ensure 
their ability to consume later. At root, the amount that 
people save or borrow is nothing more than a manifesta-
tion of countless other factors: Do they feel wealthy or 
poor? How confident are they about their future income? 
How sanguine about the economy?
An example: During this season of debt-ceiling discontent,  
Americans may be quite skeptical about government’s 
ability to provide safety nets in the future. Social Security, 
Doug Campbell  
Editor
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Spent:
Why Americans Are Saving More… 
…and Why It Makes a Difference
1.    Consumer credit outstanding includes most short- and medium-term debt  
less mortgage and other longer-term debt.Medicare, unemployment insurance—the viability of 
each has been cast into serious doubt. This factor—how 
people view government—may impel them to sock away 
more than they otherwise would have.
So if people mistrust the government safety net, our 
saving rate could rise. Great, right? Yes, though in the 
short run, when people save more and borrow less, they 
consume less, which theoretically shrinks aggregate 
demand and slows growth. That’s one of the paradoxes of 
the recession’s aftermath. People’s balance sheet decisions 
seem to work at cross-purposes with the recovery. 
The Fundamentals of Saving and Borrowing 
But beyond the short run, high saving rates tend to promote  
growth and improve standards of living. Savings usually  
get turned into investments—not so much in stocks and  
bonds, but in durables like factories and equipment. Higher  
investment levels lead to higher productivity levels (think 
computers). Standard economic models will tell you 
that higher productivity means higher incomes. In the 
medium term (between five and 20 years), higher saving 
rates encourage investment and growth. Over the longer 
term, they boost productivity and per capita income. 
How much Generation Recession will save or borrow 
going forward boils down to the basics of consumer 
finance. Fundamentally, individuals save so they can  
consume more in the future, such as in retirement.  
Likewise, they may go into debt early in their careers  
in anticipation of higher future wealth. In each case, the  
amount depends on a wide range of factors, touching on 
everything from government policy to personal preferences 
to demographics. 
Occhino zeroes in on several factors that are most closely 
tied to saving rates: 
Expected income growth is important; a medical school 
graduate may save less early on, knowing that he will be 
earning more in the future. For him, taking on some debt 
is a useful and rational way to smooth consumption. 
Personal Saving Rate
1960 1970 1980 1990 2000 2010
Sources: U.S. Department Commerce, Bureau of Economic Analysis; Federal Reserve 







Americans—especially those under 60—have amped up their 
stress levels about debt since the recession began.
The Ohio State University’s Consumer Finance Monthly survey 
neatly encapsulates the nation’s rising anxiety over debt.
For starters, the fraction of young people who believed debt was 
“no problem” shrank by 8 percentage points between 2006 and 
2010. Meanwhile, the combined percentage of those who felt 
debt was some sort of problem rose 8 percentage points.
That trend was similar among middle-aged households, whose 
debt stress (those who said debt was a small, medium, large, or 
extreme problem) grew by 6 percentage points.
2006 
35–59 -Year-Olds
2010  2006 
18–34-Year-Olds
2010 
Recession Adds to Debt Stress
Debt: No problem Debt: Small problem Debt: Medium, large, or extreme problem
Sources: Center for Human Resource Research at the Ohio State University; Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland.










25%Wealth is essential; when people have less of it, they 
are likely to build it up by saving more. Of course, lack 
of wealth can also constrain borrowing. Alternatively, if 
people feel richer, they are liable to save less. As home 
values rise, for example, people see their newfound paper 
wealth as a substitute for savings. And when people pull 
money out of their homes instead of the bank, it drives 
down the saving rate. 
Also important is uncertainty. In volatile economic 
times, it’s natural for people to set aside money against the 
possibility of job loss, medical emergencies, and so forth. 
To these evergreen drivers of saving rates, two more must 
be added to explain what happened in the United States 
starting in the late 1990s. The first is what Federal Reserve  
Chairman Ben Bernanke termed the global “savings glut.”  
Foreign countries, especially China, amassed large amounts  
of U.S. Treasury bills. Part of the effect was downward 
pressure on U.S. interest rates, which discouraged saving 
by lowering its payoff.  
Yet investment was actually encouraged, because investors  
could borrow at low rates to finance their projects. Thus, 
traditional saving went down but credit went up. All the 
houses that were sold during this period—which buyers  
confused with saving because they were confident that 
they could sell their homes at a profit come retirement—
are a case in point (though regulatory gaps certainly played  
a role as well). One might argue that the construction 
boom proved that investment is not always good for the 
economy, since overbuilding contributed to the housing 
bubble. Investment is good—until it isn’t.
A final factor, which is particularly relevant to any discussion  
about the cause of the financial crisis, is credit availability. 
Not coincidentally, the U.S. personal saving rate began to  
decline in 1980, just as consumer credit took off. With  
new information technology and innovation, financial  
institutions developed programs that expanded the 
amount of credit available to wider swaths of people.  
The evidence strongly  
suggests that credit   
availability leading up  
to 2007 had become  
exceptionally easy. 
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One piece of early evidence that sheds light on Americans’  
reduced appetite for taking on debt comes from an  
analysis of recent figures from Equifax, one of the three 
main consumer credit reporting agencies. The Cleveland 
Fed’s Yuliya Demyanyk, a senior research economist,  
has pored over millions of credit bureau files. 
What her research may suggest is that the reduction in 
overall debt levels hasn’t been driven from the supply 
side—that is, from creditors burned by reckless lending 
habits leading up to the financial crisis. The real driver 
appears to be a pulling back from the demand side, or in 
other words, from the increasingly debt-averse American 
consumer. Of course, what we don’t know is whether this 
change in behavior is temporary or generational.
Snip: More Americans  
Cutting Their Cards    23 refront F
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High-risk borrowers have sharply cut back on their applications 
for new credit since the recession began. Meanwhile, credit  
applications by low-risk borrowers—who presumably could 
obtain credit if they wanted it—have been flat.
 Both high-and low-quality borrowers have consolidated debt 
and shrunk their numbers of credit cards. Since the end of the 
recession, the average consumer has closed one credit card 
account.
Apart from technology, credit may have been expanded for  
basically bad reasons. Banks didn’t maintain solid under-
writing standards. Some products grew so complicated that  
it became difficult to judge their risk. 
These exceptional factors—the savings glut and slipshod 
lending that led to things like the housing bubble—help 
explain why saving rates plunged in the 2000s. It is not 
surprising that since the financial crisis, saving rates have 
risen again: Creditors have tightened lending standards 
and shored up their risk management practices, and 
households have been rebuilding their balance sheets.
Adding up these factors, it’s unlikely that we will soon see 
the 10 percent saving rates that prevailed decades ago. 
That’s largely because the technology that widened credit 
availability in the first place still exists and, indeed, is  
getting smarter. With more credit permanently accessible, 
savings may be naturally lower.
Perhaps the saving rate is stabilizing around 5 percent.  
It’s difficult to know whether this is a good number, but 
it is probably reasonable to say that the rate is currently 
driven by sounder fundamentals than before. For example,  
credit card borrowing is moving lower as consumers 
tighten their belts. Yet nonrevolving credit, for items like 
student loans and cars, is holding firm. This suggests that 
consumers have shifted away from using debt to finance 
consumption in nondurables and services and are now 
investing in education and longer-lived consumption 
goods—a positive trend.
A fairy tale ending? We simply don’t know yet. While 
it’s categorically true that a zero percent saving rate is 
unsustainable, an occasional dip is not necessarily cause 
for alarm. It may just mean that people are more certain 
about their future prospects, or that they believe govern-
ment backstops won’t go away. In the end, Americans  
will save or borrow at levels that depend on outside 
events. And those events may only be at the first stages  
of shaking out.  ■
Notes: Primary borrowers only, excludes bankruptcies; score is Equifax Risk Score; both consumers and lenders have contributed to the decline in open bankcard 
accounts, but the simultaneous decline in credit inquiries suggests that it’s consumers who have driven it. 
a. Bankcard trades are revolving credit loans originated by banks.
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for Low-Income Families
Saving is important for all households, but especially for 
those with low incomes. 
In fact, if low-income families can find a way to keep 
consumption steady during economic downswings, the 
benefits can be significant. One study found that low- 
income families with $500 in emergency savings had 
better financial outcomes than moderate-income families 
with lower savings. Households that are “liquid-asset 
poor” are twice as likely to experience material hardship 
after a job loss, health emergency, or other adverse event. 
The personal saving rate—which now stands around  
5 percent—provides a broad picture of Americans’  
saving habits. What it doesn’t do is highlight the significant 
differences in saving rates among people with different 
incomes. Those in the lowest income brackets consistently 
save smaller fractions of their earnings than high-income 
households, research shows. After the latest recession, 
low-income families are finding themselves in an even 
more perilous financial position than before.
In this time of stretched public resources, policymakers 
and financial institutions face new challenges in building  
safe, responsible credit products for people with low 
incomes. The Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland and the 
University of North Carolina’s Assets Building Research 
Group co-hosted a conference on this very topic in late 
2010. The conference brought together top policymakers, 
researchers, and community development specialists,  
including Ray Boshara, senior advisor with the St. Louis Fed. 
Doug Campbell  
Editor
The virtues of saving extend beyond straight-
forward financial stability; they also encompass 
less tangible indicators of well-being.
This is not surprising—if you are wealthy, 
then you are more likely to feel comfortable 
about your financial situation than you would 
be if you were poor. In fact, this intuition  
is validated in the Ohio State University’s 
Consumer Finance Monthly survey. 
The survey asks respondents how much better  
off they are, compared with a year earlier. When  
the results are broken down by average liquid 
assets per household (which includes savings, 
checking, and money market accounts), it’s 
clear that, in any given year,  those who say 
they feel better off have considerably higher 
average assets than those of the respondents 
saying they feel “worse off.” 
So while it’s intuitively clear, it has also been 
shown empirically that stress and a lack of 
savings go hand-in-hand. To improve the well- 
being of people on low incomes, addressing 
the saving problem would be a good first step.
Lower Savings=Higher Stress







Sources: Center for Human Resource Research at 
the Ohio State University; Federal Reserve Bank of 
Cleveland.
Household Situation by Average Liquid Assets
Better off Same Worse off
Households’ description of their financial situation compared to a year earlier
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Asset-building strategies
Learn more about asset-building strategies in a summary of the  
Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland’s conference, “Saving Strategies  
and Innovations for Low-Income Households,” at  
www.clevelandfed.org/saving_summary
One of the keys challenges, Boshara says, will be to provide  
low-income people with saving tools that don’t shield them  
from broader market forces. In the wake of the financial 
crisis, the knee-jerk reaction might otherwise be to avoid 
looping low-income people into saving programs for fear 
that they would lose everything in the event of another 
crisis. According to Boshara, that’s precisely the wrong 
conclusion.
“If you’re not subject to the losses, then you don’t win 
from the gains, either,” he explains. “Before the crisis,  
we extended credit and homeownership opportunities  
to people who weren’t ready for them. The problem  
was not enough access to mainstream financial services. 
We can do wealth-building more responsibly for low-
income people.” 
As many as half of all Americans—most of them in the 
bottom half of the income distribution—do not save at  
all, largely because they lack access to saving instruments. 
Employers who pay low wages are less likely to offer 
401(k) plans, for example, let alone direct deposit of wages 
into employees’ bank accounts. This disconnect between 
low-wage earners and the formal financial services industry 
forms a significant part of the problem.
The question is why people with low incomes don’t 
engage in formal saving plans. Is it because of their lack 
of interest—or the financial industry’s failure to provide 
targeted services?  
“Industry folks say the demand isn’t there,” maintains  
David Newville, senior policy analyst with the Center for 
Financial Services Innovation. “There is sometimes not a 
lot of interest in delivering a new savings project” by the 
private industry. 
Nonetheless, Newville says, a number of saving programs 
aimed at people with low incomes are being developed.  
Some of the more familiar ones are listed in the box above.  ■
Product/Provider






New America Foundation’s 
Asset Building Program 
with MDRC, a nonprofit 
organization
BankOn USA
Dozens of independent 
programs nationwide
How It Works
A nonprofit association sponsors a saver, who opens an 
IDA at a financial institution and participates in financial 
education classes. The sponsor matches every dollar the 
saver deposits in the IDA. 
When tempted to buy something non-essential, the 
consumer texts or tweets piggymojo instead, which 
notifies the consumer’s partner about the money  
not spent.
Employers set up a channel for workers to deposit a  
portion of each paycheck directly into a dedicated,  
flexible savings account.
Participating financial institutions charge low-income 
customers reduced or no fees to open accounts, waive 
monthly minimum balance requirements, eliminate 
certain overdraft charges, and accept government  
identification cards from other countries.
Benefits
Research shows that IDAs help connect disadvantaged 
populations to mainstream financial services and have  
a positive effect on their saving.
Piggymojo provides a concrete way to save in the  
moment and reinforces the saver’s decisions with  
positive feedback. 
 
Because it is integrated with the regular paycheck,  
AutoSave removes inconvenient barriers to saving and 
makes the process seamless and habitual.
BankOn helps low-income people avoid predatory  
lenders and expensive check-cashing services. 
    25 refront FRenting:  
The New American Dream
Homeownership has long been the American Dream.  
It’s a status symbol and has been regarded as one of the 
best long-term investments a family can make. In fact, 
buying a house can make a lot of sense for communities,  
too: Much research suggests that the stability that comes 
with homeownership promotes good citizenship, improves 
the quality of neighborhoods, and is linked with the  
academic success of homeowners’ children. 
But have lessons from the Great Recession changed the 
way Americans—both borrowers and lenders—think 
about owning a home? Given the fallout in the housing 
market, maybe renting will be the new American Dream. 
And that’s something policymakers will have to weigh 
very carefully.
The Recession’s Impact on Housing 
From 1997 to 2006, U.S. home prices rose nearly 10 percent  
a year on average, according to the S&P/Case-Shiller 
National Home Price Index. A decade was long enough, 
says economist Robert Shiller in a recent New York Times 
article, “for many people to become accustomed to the 
pace and to view it as normal…. People who owned a 
home over that period had reason to feel pretty well off 
and proud of their investment acumen.” 
Then came the financial crisis. Home values crashed  
from their peak of almost $23 trillion in 2006 to just over 
$16 trillion in the first quarter of 2011. And since the crisis,  
lenders have been tightening underwriting standards, 
making it tougher for would-be homeowners to get loans. 
It can also be tough to get government financing, including  
Federal Housing Administration and Veterans Administra-
tion loans, especially for those with credit scores below 600  
or without enough money for a 3.5 percent down payment. 
And those with a foreclosure in their past can’t get any 
type of financing for seven years.
Amy Koehnen  
Managing Editor
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As a result of the housing market fallout, the latest  
Case-Shiller annual survey of homebuyer attitudes 
showed people’s median expectation for annual home 
price appreciation over the next decade down sharply,  
to just 3 percent (versus 7 percent in 2005). 
Meanwhile, U.S. homeownership rates have been heading 
down and rental rates going up. Since the end of 2006, 
the number of renters has grown faster than the number 
of owners has declined. This means, says Senior Research 
Economist Emre Ergungor of the Cleveland Fed, that 
most new households are renting, whether by choice or 
by necessity.
When the housing bubble burst in 2007, 31.6 percent of 
households rented their homes. Now, it’s 33.6 percent. 
Since the crisis, nearly 3 million households have become 
renters, and at least 3 million more are expected by 2015, 
according to census data analyzed by Harvard’s Joint 
Center for Housing Studies and the Associated Press.  
It’s hard to know what exactly is behind those numbers—
anybody who went through a foreclosure, for example, 
would probably have to become a renter—but the trend 
is clear enough.
Stubborn Attitudes 
Yet the American Dream endures. Homeowners and 
renters continue to believe that homeownership is a smart 
decision over the long term. Surveys by Fannie Mae, the  
National Association of Home Builders, and Pew Research  
find that a great majority still believe homeownership is a 
sound investment. 
Meanwhile, as Americans cling to their beliefs, economists  
have been debating some of the ways that the housing 
market crash has been hurting the economic recovery. 
With the glut of empty homes brought on by foreclosure, 
there’s hardly any market for new construction. And many 
owners are discovering that their homes have proven 
to be an unreliable form of savings. Unfortunately, this 
is particularly true in regions where the housing bust 
has contributed directly to high rates of unemployment 
through construction job losses.  
A new study conducted by faculty at Florida International 
University and East Carolina University uses data from 
1979 to 2009 to propose that renting has been a better 
investment strategy than buying a home for the past  
30 years. The authors reason that it’s not actual home-
ownership that creates wealth but rather the forced savings  
that come from having an amortizing mortgage. And 
creating wealth can be done—and done better by more 
people—through other means. 
The Best Investment? 
Americans Weigh in 
on Homeownership
• 37 percent of Americans
 “strongly agree” that homeownership 
    is the best long-term investment one  
can make.
  •  41 percent of homeowners
  “strongly agree.”
  •  31 percent of current renters
  “strongly agree.”
• 85 percent of American 
    homeowners at least “somewhat agree”  
that buying a home is the best long-term 
investment one can make.
• 85 percent of current renters 
    want to buy a house at some point.
  •  17 percent want to continue 
to rent.
Total Owner- and Renter-Occupied Housing Units
1990 1995 2000 2005 2010


















Source: Pew Research Center.
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The question for policymakers is how to square two  
potentially competing forces: a housing market with less- 
than-certain investment returns and higher barriers to entry  
for low-income borrowers; and the persistent aspirations 
of many Americans to own their own home. The ultimate 
goal is to make sure individual households’ needs are met 
while keeping neighborhoods stable and vibrant.
The collapse of the housing market and subprime crisis 
remind us that policies to promote homeownership can 
harm households if those policies encourage unaffordable  
mortgage commitments. At the same time, we know from  
experience that American neighborhoods are more likely 
to thrive when their occupants are owners, probably 
because of the stability ownership brings. A balance must 
be struck, and it won’t be easy. The next generation may 
cling to ambitions of homeownership for good reasons, 
but economic reality may dictate otherwise.  ■
Survey data
Eli Beracha and Ken H. Johnson. 2011. “Lessons from 
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American Dream Always Wise?” (April 19): 
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National Association of Homebuilders. 2011. 
Press release (June 7): www.nahb.org/news_details.
aspx?newsID=12823&fromGSA=1
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Still.” Pew Social & Demographic Trends (April 12): 
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still/
For many years, the U.S. government has explicitly or 
implicitly subsidized homeowner ship through programs 
such as Federal Housing Administration insurance, the 
mortgage interest deduction, Fannie Mae and Freddie 
Mac, and many others. But some policymakers question 
this approach. 
From the former head of the Federal Deposit Insurance 
Corporation to U.S. Representative Barney Frank, not 
to mention the Obama Administration, policymakers 
are proposing many options for keeping neighborhoods 
viable by boosting rental properties. For example, in 
August, the Federal Housing Administration announced 
plans to ask investors for their ideas on how to turn  
thousands of foreclosed homes into rentals. 
Here are a few policies that are now being re-evaluated  
in the aftermath of the Great Recession:
•		Low	Income	Housing	Tax	Credit	-	An	indirect	federal	
subsidy used to finance the development of affordable 
rental housing for low-income households
•		Shared	Appreciation	Mortgages	-	A	mortgage	in	which	
the borrower is offered the chance to write down a  
portion of his mortgage debt, but is required to share 
future appreciation gains with the lender; currently  
prevented by U.S. tax barriers
•		Mortgage	Interest	Deduction	-	A	common	itemized	
deduction that allows homeowners to deduct the  
interest they pay on any loan used to build, purchase,  
or improve their primary or secondary residence
 Regardless of what policy is being discussed, policy-
makers need to remember that different regions might 
need to have solutions tailored to their specific markets. 
Here in the Fourth District, for example, policy makers 
have to deal with the reality that programs like converting 
bank-owned (foreclosed) property into rental property 
may not be economically viable. There already is a large 
oversupply of housing in this region, and cash-strapped 
municipalities are under e quipped to take on the additional 
oversight responsibilities associated with such conversions.
Post-Recession  
Policies 
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Pinning Hopes on Small Businesses to 
Reignite Economy May Not Be the Best Idea
Anne M. DiTeodoro  
Communications Coordinator
Second, small businesses really took it on the chin during 
the recession. Between 2007 and 2009, self-employment 
fell, thousands of small firms vanished, and the pace of 
new business formation slowed. That’s a pretty significant  
blow to recover from, and it’s not clear how resilient today’s  
entrepreneurs will prove to be. 
These two factors could potentially slow the pace of small 
business growth in the years ahead. That’s a problem  
because small businesses really do foster the sort of 
innovation the country desperately needs after the 
Great Recession. Nobody wants an environment where 
entrepreneurs are inhibited in their efforts to get started. 
Economic research, including studies by the Cleveland 
Fed, suggests that some government programs could  
be helpful in this regard. 
Shocks Still Strong for Small Firms
As the recession deepened in 2009, especially in the first 
quarter, small firms accounted for almost 60 percent of 
job losses, according to the SBA. A mid-August 2011 
survey by the National Federation of Independent Busi-
ness reports that small-business owners are still stuck in 
recession-level growth trends, and the Bureau of Labor 
Statistics reports the growth in new business startups is 
the weakest it has been since the early 1990s, when the 
data were first tracked.
Small business is actually quite big in America. In fact, 
according to the Small Business Administration’s (SBA) 
definition of small businesses—firms with fewer than 
500 employees—they comprise 99.7 percent of all  
U.S. companies. They employ about half of the country’s 
private-sector workforce and are an important source of 
new job generation in the early phases of business-cycle 
expansions. 
No wonder Americans are watching and waiting for  
the resurgence of small businesses to reignite the hiring 
process and get the economy back on track after the  
Great Recession. 
But here are two things to consider about that premise. 
First, small businesses are not exactly the mass creators of 
jobs and wealth that they’re often cracked up to be. 
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Foundation, which finds that today’s businesses start out 
smaller—and stay smaller—than their predecessors, 
rarely growing past their start-up employment levels.  
In fact, this research suggests that companies established 
in 2009 might now employ a million fewer people than 
the historic norm. 
The Risks and Rewards of Launching a Business
Despite this evidence to the contrary, the myth of the 
entrepreneur endures. Small-business owners believe that 
running their own shop is best. High risk, high reward. 
Consider Mark Zuckerberg, co-founder of Facebook,  
billionaire, and entrepreneur: a resounding success story. 
But Zuckerberg is far from the norm. Think of a plumber, 
for example, who leaves a larger company to run his own 
business. He struggles—getting clients, setting up a billing  
system, juggling the workload, deciding whether to hire 
others—and ultimately, he may not make any money. 
“For every Mark Zuckerberg, there are a million guys  
like the struggling plumber,” says Scott Shane, visiting 
scholar at the Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland and the 
A. Malachi Mixon III professor of entrepreneurial studies at 
the Weatherhead School of Management at Case Western 
Reserve University. “Americans pay more attention to the 
success stories, but it’s the statistics that don’t follow suit. 
And the media tend to overstate the probability of good 
outcomes.”
Truth is, the vast majority of people who start a business 
go back to wage employment or working for others. “If 
they spend four years getting a business off the ground, 
when they return to the workforce, it will take them lon-
ger to recoup the wages they were making four years prior. 
In addition, many of them have also pumped much of 
their savings into their business, and those funds are now 
gone,” Shane says. 
Policy Challenges
But Facebook stories do exist. Most big businesses started 
small. Even though their contribution is sometimes  
oversold, small businesses are indeed integral to economic 
growth.
40
Number of all high-tech workers  
(scientists, engineers, etc.), in percent,  
hired by small businesses
44
Percent of U.S.  
total private payroll paid  
by small businesses
64
Total net new jobs, in percent,  
over the past 15 years generated  
by small businesses 
13
Number of times more per employee that 
small businesses produce patents compared 
to large patenting firms 
99.7
Percent of small businesses  
representing all employer firms
Sources: U.S. Dept. of Commerce, Bureau of the Census; International 
Trade Administration; Advocacy-funded research by Kathryn Kobe;  
CHI Research; U.S. Department of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics.
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ment in which they can flourish. Usually, innovation 
blooms anew after recessions, as laid-off workers start 
their own firms and work on ideas that were ignored by 
corporate bureaucracies. We should all be concerned 
about an economy in which people shy away—or are 
discouraged—from innovating.
As Shane puts it: “We don’t want to discourage innovation 
and the extreme high-growth companies.”
The challenge is to develop policies that address the  
specific needs of small businesses. For example, small 
firms spend more per employee than larger firms to 
comply with federal regulations such as healthcare, taxes, 
and environmental rules, and these costs may increase 
under new restrictions. “Even if the post-crisis regulations 
aren’t heavier, there is a perception that they are, and if 
small-business owners believe it’s going to be a burden to 
comply, then they’re going to hold back,” Shane says.
Access to credit is another sticking point. The decade 
leading up to 2007 was part of the housing boom. Small-
business owners relied heavily on their personal property 
as collateral to obtain capital for their enterprises. In the 
wake of the recession, though, these owners are dealing 
with declining property values that limit their ability to 
obtain credit for financing their businesses.
Policymakers have intervened in the past, helping to buoy 
small-business owners. For example, the American Recovery 
and Reinvestment Act, enacted in February 2009, included  
several provisions targeted specifically at small businesses, 
such as tax incentives, reduced fees on certain SBA loans, 
and monetary support to help programs that promote 
economic development and entrepreneurship.
A working paper from the Cleveland Fed notes that  
“small businesses are likely to remain a sacred cow of 
public policy,” and will probably enjoy continued govern-
ment support. There is evidence that some government 
interventions are effective. The researchers found that 
government interventions in small-enterprise credit 
markets, such as SBA loan guarantees, produce a positive 
impact on economic outcomes, especially when an inter-
vention is designed to correct a market failure. 
Because they serve as a substitute for collateral or 
relationships with loan officers, SBA loan guarantees are 
meant to increase the credit extended to small businesses. 
They allow lenders to charge a lower interest rate on the 
loan while mitigating their own risk on the longer-term 
loans that are the most useful for small businesses’ capital 
investment.
But the plight of small businesses puts policymakers in a 
bind—there is no such thing as a “model” small business.  
“It’s not easy to design a policy for small businesses, because  
it’s also a policy for consumers,” says Shane, who points 
out that many small-business owners run their companies 
as extensions of their households, often mixing business 
and personal funds.
Also, small businesses are quite diverse; their issues  
differ widely, depending on whether the owner has five  
or 100 or 500 employees. As with so many other sectors,  
the future of small businesses remains uncertain in the  
wake of the Great Recession. Shane cautions, “I’m not sure  
we want policymakers to get us back to 2007. Many people  
believe we were experiencing a small-business bubble, 
driven by rising housing prices and the use of home 
equity to finance businesses. If we had a base point to 
compare to where we want to be, then we would be able 
to state if today’s levels are above or below where  
we should be.
“But,” he observes, “we don’t know what is normal.”  ■
Recommended reading
Scott Shane. 2011. “The Great Recession’s Effect on Entrepreneurship.” 
Economic Commentary, Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland (March). 
www.clevelandfed.org/research/commentary/2011/2011-04.cfm
Mark Schweitzer and Scott Shane. 2010. “The Effect of Falling  
Home Prices on Small Business Borrowing.” Economic Commentary, 
Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland (December). 
www.clevelandfed.org/research/commentary/2010/2010-18.cfm
Ben R. Craig, William E. Jackson III, and James B. Thomson. 2011. 
“Public Policy in Support of Small Business: The American Experience.” 
Working Paper, Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland (August). 
www.clevelandfed.org/research/workpaper/2011/wp1116.pdf
We should all be concerned about an economy in which 
people shy away—or are discouraged—from innovating.
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of higher education. But tell that to the growing numbers 
of college graduates who find themselves serving coffee 
and stocking shelves. You might call them overqualified; 
economists dub them “mismatched.” 
Mismatches occur when workers accept jobs for which they 
are overqualified because none are available in their field 
or when workers who want to work full time accept part-
time jobs because that’s all they can find. Some mismatch, 
however, is part of a healthy, dynamic economy. If every 
firm with a job opening waited for the perfect match or if 
every unemployed worker waited for the perfect job, the 
economy would stagnate. In fact, a mismatch can be ideal 
for the firm, which may get a worker with more education 
for the same price as a less-educated one.
What’s not clear, though, is how much mismatch is either 
ideal or healthy for an economy. In the wake of the last 
recession, more college grads are getting hit by the mismatch 
phenomenon, according to data from the Current Popula-
tion Survey (CPS). This trend predates the recession, but 
it has accelerated since 2007. 
Looking at data from the CPS, which contains information  
for hundreds of different occupations, we found a small 
increase in the percent of bachelor’s degree holders in 
occupations that do not require a degree. It’s unclear 
whether the increase observed during the recession is 
significant, so we narrowed our focus to 33 occupations 
that don’t require bachelor’s or associate’s degrees—such 
as bartenders, waiters, retail salespersons, and hotel desk 
clerks—and seem most likely to draw underemployed 
degree holders. In 2004, 14.7 percent of employees in these  
occupations had bachelor’s degrees. In 2007, that number  
had edged up to 15.3 percent (a 0.6 percentage point gain). 
 By 2010, it was 17 percent (a 1.7 percentage point increase).  
The difference in pre- and post-recession rates of change 
corresponds to 356,000 people, or 2.6 percent of the 
unemployed. The result, unfortunately, does not resolve 
the question of how significantly job mismatches feature 
in the post-recession economy. 
College graduates invest in their education with time and 
money (or parents’ money); societies invest in education 
with taxpayer subsidies to universities and with subsidized  
and guaranteed debt. If grads take a low-skilled job after 
college, they may not be producing a high-value product  
or service, not getting a high return on their human capital,  
and probably not earning enough to pay off their debts 
and stimulate the economy as consumers.  
It is also worrisome that while grads are employed in low-
skilled jobs, their human capital is depreciating. “They 
forget things they learned in school. They probably won’t 
keep up with advancements in their once-chosen field,” 
says Stephan Whitaker, research economist at the Federal 
Mary Zenker  
Research Analyst
  Use It or Lose It:  
College Grads  
and  
Underemployment
 32  Fall 2011Big events can spawn big changes. It’s not obvious yet how 
much of an impact the recession had on young people’s  
attitudes toward higher education. But some early evidence  
is encouraging because it shows the value of higher education 
for people’s economic situations. Consider the recent drop in 
the rate of labor force participation: It has coincided with an 
increase in college enrollment, suggesting that young people 
may be beefing up their skills before entering the work force.
It’s worth noting that women are now enrolling in college  
in greater numbers than men. Another lingering question  
in the wake of the Great Recession is whether men—who  
traditionally held lower-skilled but relatively well-paying  
manufacturing and construction jobs—will find new niches  
in the new economy.
One piece of subjective evidence on the long-term importance 
of higher education comes from the Ohio State University’s 
Consumer Finance Monthly survey. It found that 47 percent of 
families whose members’ highest education levels topped out 
at “some or completed high school” rated themselves as worse 
off financially in 2010 than in 2009. By comparison, 37 percent 
of respondents with between five and eight years of education 
after high school said they were worse off.
While this doesn’t necessarily suggest changes in future behavior  
with regard to college enrollment, it’s at least noteworthy that the  
survey results seem to confirm that people with multiple years 
of education beyond high school have weathered the recession 
better than those with less education.
Some or  
Completed High School
Compared with 2009, respondent’s family is…
Five to Eight Years Education  
beyond High School
The Enduring Appeal of Higher Education
Sources: Center for Human Resource Research at the Ohio State University; 
Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland.
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Reserve Bank of Cleveland. “They won’t gain career-related  
work experience to make themselves more productive. 
And if they do get back on their chosen career path, their 
earnings growth will start later, so their lifetime earnings 
will be lower.”
Less-skilled workers without degrees can also be hurt 
by the growing underemployment trend. Economic 
theory tells us that when there are more workers in the 
low-skilled market, wages are depressed for everyone in 
that market. When grads are hired in place of less-skilled 
workers, it decreases the chances that those workers will 
be able to find jobs and build their work histories.
So while some mismatches are part of a healthy economy, 
too many can be a waste of human capital. The ability to 
make a good match once a student has earned a degree 
is certainly part of the motivation for pursuing higher 
education. And conventional wisdom actually still holds: 
High education levels are critical for economic growth. 
Research, including studies by the Federal Reserve Bank 
of Cleveland, shows that states with higher percentages of 
college graduates also have the fastest economic growth.   
How much the most recent recession changed young 
people’s (or taxpayers’) attitudes about the value of an  
education is therefore of critical interest to economists—
and anyone else interested in America’s economic future.  ■
Recommended reading
Stephan Whitaker and Mary Zenker. 2011. “Are Underemployed  
Graduates Displacing Nongraduates?” Economic Trends (July). 
www.clevelandfed.org/research /trends/2011/0711/01labmar.cfm
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territory” is getting a work-
out these days. The recent 
recession was so deep that 
many have found them-
selves at a loss trying to  
predict the way forward.  
In thinking about the future,  
it’s often useful to recall les-
sons from the past.
Economist Price Fishback 
has made a career of that 
practice. He has become one 
of the nation’s go-to experts 
for explaining the differences  
and similarities between 
the Great Depression and 
the Great Recession. He’s 
blogged about it for the  
New York Times and been 
quoted by many other news 
outlets on the same topic. 
His latest research delves 
into the microeconomics of 
the New Deal, examining  
the myriad programs 
introduced in the 1930s and 
ferreting out which ones 
worked, and which didn’t.
For all the doubts about 
the nation’s ability to 
recover from this recession, 
Fishback is firmly in the 
optimists’ camp. If history 
is any guide—and Fishback 
certainly believes it is—then 
the evidence points in favor 
of a healthy economy for 
generations to come.
Fishback is the Thomas R. 
Brown Professor of  
Economics at the University 
of Arizona. He serves as a 
research associate with the 
National Bureau of Economic 
Research and as co-editor  
of the Journal of Economic 
History. Mark Sniderman, 
chief policy officer at the 
Federal Reserve Bank of 
Cleveland, interviewed 
Fishback at the Bank on 
















Sniderman: Let’s start by having you 
characterize for us the period that we 
now refer to as the Great Depression. 
What was it like from an economic  
perspective; its impact on people?
Fishback: At the time, people thought 
it was going to be a normal recession, 
and then it just kept on sliding down-
ward. They didn’t know exactly what 
was going on. There were all sorts of 
differences of opinions on when the 
economy would start to improve.  
Real output in the economy dropped 
by 30 percent over four years. In other 
words, in 1933 they were producing  
only 70 percent of what they had 
produced in 1929. It was as if you had 
cut off the western half of the United 
States in terms of output. 
Unemployment levels that started  
out around 2 percent in late 1929 
went up to 10 percent in 1930, then to  
16 percent in 1931. And then they were  
over 20 percent for four years, from 
1932 to 1935. The rates dropped back 
down to 14 percent in 1937, and then 
they skyrocketed back up to 19 percent  
in 1938. We don’t see less than  
10 percent unemployment until 1941. 
Here you have this economy that  
is totally falling apart. However, if  
you could hold onto your job, you 
actually did reasonably well during the  
Depres sion because of the tremendous 
deflation. The price level dropped 
30 percent between 1929 and 1933. 
People could buy a great deal more 
with a dollar in 1933 than in 1929. 
But the problem was holding onto 
your job. 
The Depression lasted so very long 
that there were people unemployed for 
five or six or seven years. It devastated 
some household heads. Many people 
moved back in with their families or 
friends. People reverse-migrated back 
to rural areas and lived with family  
on farms. There was a surge in the 
number of  “hobos” and people just  
traveling around. Somewhere between  
1 and 2 percent of the population  
became common vagrants. People 
were sleeping underneath their 
“Hoover blankets,” or newspapers 
they found on the street. 
The Depression just destroyed people’s  
confidence in what was going to  
happen. In the United States in most 
time periods, people have been very 
optimistic about what is going to 
happen in the future. There are always 
some people who are in trouble, 
but generally we’ve had an average 
growth rate in per capita income of 
1.6 percent per year since 1840. That 
includes all the depressions. 
Given that kind of growth, the  
Great Depression is very unusual 
in American history. People kept 
expecting that things would get better 
because income typically has doubled 
about every generation or so. But  
10 years of depression with millions 
of people who thought they had done 
everything right finding themselves 
unemployed will shake anybody’s 
confidence.
Sniderman: At the time the Great  
Depression set in, was there much  
expectation about the federal  
government playing a role?
Fishback: Before the Depression,  
welfare policy and labor policies were 
all the responsibilities of the local 
and state governments. What was so 
unusual about the 1930s was the idea 
that the federal government would get  
involved in providing relief to the poor  
and unemployed. It was the first time 
that federal officials thought of the 
economy as being more than a group 
of local economies. They argued that 
the federal government should get 
involved because this was a national 
emergency. 
The federal government’s primary role  
up to that time had been to provide  
national defense. We created a central  
bank in 1913 with the Federal Reserve.  
There was some federal regulation for 
interstate commerce like railroads and 
various foods and drugs traded across 
state lines. But there wasn’t really a 
sense that the federal government was 
going to come in and use spending to 
stimulate the economy. Those were 
Keynesian notions that developed with 
John Maynard Keynes’ writings in  
the early and mid-1930s. The typical 
person’s attitude toward government 
was quite different in 1900 than it is 
today. 
The federal government was probably 
spending about 4 percent of GDP in 
1929. State and local governments were 
probably spending another 10 percent 
of GDP. It was a whole different time. 
Bob Higgs, my thesis adviser, wrote a 
great book, Crisis and Leviathan. He 
argues that there was a real change in 
attitudes toward government associated  
with three major crises. World War I  
was the first big crisis, followed by the  
Great Depression of the 1930s, and 
then World War II. In each case people  
wanted [the government] to respond 
quickly. They did not want to trust the 
markets to help them move quickly 
because it is really expensive to try to 
produce things quickly. 
Armen Alchian [emeritus professor 
of economics at the University of 
California, Los Angeles] pointed out 
that every time you do something fast, 
it raises the costs. To avoid imposing  
these costs on taxpayers, they imposed  
a draft where they put young men in  
the army but paid them poorly. During  
the wars, the federal government and 
the military took over the economy, 
chose how to allocate all of the key 
war materials, and established wage 
and price controls. Meanwhile, they 
rationed all sorts of goods to the 
general public. 
The government was very active in 
each crisis. Then after the crisis was 
over, the federal influence dropped 
back down. When people first started 
dealing with the crisis in World War I,  
they thought, “We don’t know if we can  
do this.” But over the course of a two-
to-three-year period, they developed 
all sorts of techniques for solving the 
problems that came up. They were 
learning by doing. As a result, they 
concluded that trying to run a com-
mand economy was not quite as bad 
as they thought it would be—even 
though they still were not very good 
at running it. 
If you could hold onto your job,  
you actually did reasonably well  
during the Depression because of   
the tremendous deflation. 
    35 refront FPrice V. Fishback
Position
Thomas R. Brown Professor of Economics, University of Arizona
Education
Butler University, BA with honors, 1977 
University of Washington, PhD, 1983
Research and Teaching Interests  
Economic History, Labor Economics, Political Economy,  
Law and Economics
Selected Publications
 Government and the American Economy: A New History, editor and co-author, 2007, 
University of Chicago Press.
Prelude to the Welfare State: The Origins of Workers’ Compensation, with  
Shawn E. Kantor, 2000, University of Chicago Press.
“ The Influence of the Home Owners’ Loan Corporation on Housing Markets During 
the 1930s,” with Shawn Kantor, Alfonso Flores-Lagunes, William Horrace, and  
Jaret Treber, 2010, Review of Financial Studies.
“ The Dynamics of Relief Spending and the Private Urban Labor Market During the New 
Deal,” with Todd Neumann and Shawn Kantor, 2010, Journal of Economic History.
“ Births, Deaths, and New Deal Relief During the Great Depression,” with  
Michael Haines and Shawn Kantor, 2007, Review of Economics and Statistics.
So when the next crisis hit, they 
brought back a lot of the same pro-
grams, and the government ratcheted 
up again, often to new heights. In  
fact, there really was not much time 
for the government to ratchet down 
between the Great Depression and 
World War II. During World War II 
the federal government’s control of 
the economy really escalated. Basically,  
the military was running half the 
economy. They eliminated unemploy-
ment by drafting roughly 10 percent of  
the work force. There were wage and 
price controls and rationing—meat 
once a week and limited access to 
sugar. Forty-five percent of income 
was being spent on munitions and 
hardware that was eventually going  
to be blown up. 
After the war, the federal government 
dropped back down but not to any-
where near what had been before.
Sniderman: So it’s a ratchet effect.
Fishback: Yes, like those ratchet 
wrenches. It never came back down to 
the old level. You can see this dynamic 
later on. The crises have been smaller, 
but we had the Great Society in the 
1960s, and you can actually see it 
today. With the problems we saw in 
2007 and 2008, those problems led 
to a huge increase in activity with the 
stimulus packages.
Sniderman: Let’s go back to the 1930s 
a bit. The federal government isn’t all 
that practiced in interventions to deal 
with the Great Depression. Is it fair to 
characterize all of the various programs 
and efforts to deal with it as experimen-
tation of one sort or another?
Fishback: To some extent it is. What 
happened is the federal government 
built upon what the states had been 
doing. For example, the welfare system  
went through one of its major long- 
term changes during the 1930s. The  
first response was a short-run response. 
We need to get people back to work! 
Between 1933 and 1935, the federal 
government spent a tremendous 
amount of money providing direct 
relief to people who were not readily 
able to work. They then provided 
relief with a work requirement for 
people who were able. 
In 1935, Harry Hopkins, who had 
been running the Federal Emergency 
Relief Administration (FERA), was 
not satisfied with how that adminis-
tration had been running. The FERA 
was giving money to the states, which 
then largely determined how it would 
be spent. The administration had 
very little control because the only 
way they could change state internal 
distributions they didn’t like was to 
threaten to take all of the money away. 
Hopkins actually made that threat to 
some states, but having to use such a 
big threat was not very effective. 
In 1935, the federal government 
rearranged the relief programs. They 
passed responsibility for direct relief 
back to the states for people who could  
not be employed very easily. The 
FERA was replaced with the Works  
Progress Administration (WPA). 
When Hopkins ran the WPA, the 
federal government had much more 
control over each project. The states 
just told them who was eligible to 
obtain work on the projects. 
There was another side to relief. The 
Social Security Act was passed in 1935.  
It included the old-age pensions we  
all know as Social Security, and that 
program was, and still is, run at the  
national level. The Act also added three 
public-assistance programs, in which 
the federal government provides 
matching grants to the states. 
Another big change with the Social 
Security Act was the introduction of 
unemployment insurance. Wisconsin 
had actually started a program before 
1935 but had not paid benefits yet. The  
federal government provided about  
3 percent of the cost for administration  
and each state set its own benefits. 
The unemployment insurance funds 
were run like an insurance fund where 
all the employers paid into it. When 
someone became unemployed, he 
was paid out of the fund collected 
from employers.
Between 1933 and 1935, the federal  
government spent a tremendous 
amount of money providing direct 
relief to people who were not readily 
able to work.
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reaction to all these new programs?
Fishback: There were thousands of 
letters written to President Roosevelt, 
which you can find in the national 
archives. Many of the letters describe  
how grateful people were that  
Roosevelt had actually found a way  
to provide them with some help. 
There were also letters to specific 
agencies complaining about the way 
people were treated on some programs: 
some complaints of corruption and 
politicking. Investigations of these 
typically found that about one-fourth 
of the complaints were valid.
Sniderman: Today, of course, the  
sluggish housing market seems to be 
continuing to hold back the recovery. 
What was going on during the 1930s  
on that front?
Fishback: The situation today has 
some great similarities with the 1920s 
and 1930s. There was a huge housing 
boom in the 1920s. Housing prices 
peaked in the late 1920s, and then 
they dropped like a stone between 
1929 and 1933. In surveys of cities, 
the typical drop in housing prices was 
about 30 percent from 1930 to 1933. 
The overall drop from 1930 to 1940 
averaged about 45 percent. 
As a matter of fact, around 1933 or 
1934, there were a huge number of 
people who were two-and-a-half years 
behind on their mortgage. More than 
half the states had passed mortgage 
moratoriums, which allowed people 
to stay in their house without paying 
the mortgage payments. Most of the 
people also owed a large amount in 
property taxes. 
That is when the federal government 
came up with an idea of the Home 
Owners’ Loan Corporation [HOLC]. 
There were all these lenders with toxic 
assets on their books, all these mort-
gages that could not be repaid. So the 
HOLC bought all these mortgages 
for pretty close to the full value of the 
loan, including the unpaid interest. 
In the modern jargon, the lenders 
did not take a “haircut.” Basically, the 
HOLC gave the lenders a good deal 
by replacing their toxic assets with 
good assets. They also gave the home-
owner a good deal as well.
Sniderman: How does that compare 
with today’s Home Affordable  
Modification Program, or HAMP?
Fishback: The problem with the  
situation today is they’ve been trying 
to refinance the loans with the lender 
keeping the loan. Often the HAMP 
program has involved the lender  
taking a pretty substantial haircut.  
It is a voluntary program, so you have 
to attract the lenders, but not many of 
the lenders thought that the program 
was a good deal for them. As a result, 
the HAMP was projected to refinance 
about 3 to 4 million loans. But a year 
after the program started, they were 
well short of a million.
Sniderman: Could you talk a little about 
the Progressive Era and compare it to the  
period leading up to the 2007 recession?
Fishback: Sure. I’m involved in writing 
a book with University of Arizona PhD  
student Carl Kitchens about booms 
and busts in American history. And 
really the story of American history 
is far more boom than bust. Seventy 
percent of the time the U.S. economy  
has been in booms. Then the other 
times we have had these short reces-
sions. Then there is the occasional  
big bust, like during the 1890s and the 
Great Depression. As I said before,  
per capita income has risen 1.6 percent 
per year on average over the long haul, 
even while including bad times like 
the Great Depression. 
As a result, in most periods of American 
history, people have pretty optimistic  
views because things have been going  
well for quite some time. The Progres-
sive Era runs from 1890 to the 1920s. 
During most of this period GDP 
was growing. The typical worker was 
doing better. The typical wage in real 
terms rose 50 percent in the time 
period, maybe a little bit more. You 
saw huge surges in immigration into 
the United States, just gigantic surges 
of immigration. U.S. annual earnings 
in manufacturing and mining were 
often two to three times as high as the 
wages the immigrants had made in 
their home countries. 
The 1920s were very prosperous. 
Radio arrives, people are buying 
automobiles and new appliances. 
There are flappers out there doing the 
Charleston dance, great new jazz mu-
sic is flowing out of the speakeasies. 
Babe Ruth is hitting home runs, and 
Jack Dempsey is punching people out. 
It’s a fast-paced era. Even when things 
started going down halfway through 
1929, people think it’s just going to be 
a short recession, not a big deal.
Sniderman: What do you think are  
some major misperceptions about the 
New Deal period?
Fishback: For the last 10 years I’ve 
been working with a number of  
co-authors on the microeconomics 
of the New Deal. Almost all the work 
had been on the macroeconomic 
side, the money supply and govern-
ment spending. During the 1930s, 
the federal government did not really 
run big deficits. It’s not a Keynesian 
period at all. They increased govern-
ment spending—Hoover raised it 
quite a bit, by 58 percent in nominal 
terms over a three-year period. Given 
the deflation, it rose 88 percent in real 
terms, which was a faster pace than 
anything Roosevelt did—but both 
groups believed in balanced budgets. 
So they raised tax rates and tax  
revenues just as fast. 
In most periods of American history, 
people have pretty optimistic views 
because things have been going well  
for quite some time.
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how much the federal government 
spent in state and local areas. We’ve 
been collecting information at the  
individual level, at the county level, 
and at the city level, and using that 
variation in how much they spent over 
time and across place to try to see the 
local effect of these programs. It’s not 
the same thing as the macro effect;  
it’s the local effect. 
The most successful programs as far as 
we could tell were the relief programs 
and the public works programs. The 
relief programs included the Federal 
Emergency Relief Administration and  
the Works Progress Administration  
(WPA). They also had a series of 
programs like the Public Roads 
Administration and the Public Works 
Administration that built public 
works. The public works programs 
were more generous than the relief 
programs because they actually hired 
people at full wages. These programs 
combined seemed to do some really 
positive things. They put people back 
to work.
Sniderman: In the 1930s, it seemed  
like the Federal Reserve was a teenager 
relative to the current era. What do you 
think of that characterization?
Fishback: The Fed was formed in 1913.  
The founding legislation stated that 
the Fed was supposed to provide  
an “elastic currency.” Many people 
thought what this meant was the Fed 
was supposed to provide liquidity 
to stop banking panics. But it wasn’t 
neces sarily clear how they were  
supposed to do that. When you get 
to the late 1920s, the Federal Reserve 
has a notion of what’s known as the 
“real bills doctrine.” The focus was to 
provide more credit at a time when 
businesses were seeking more credit 
while they were expanding. 
But that left the Fed as a passive 
responder to what was going on with 
the economy. So, many leaders in 
the Federal Reserve were following 
this passive model of the real bills 
doctrine. They were saying that unless 
they see demand for liquidity that’s 
going along with businesses, then 
they won’t do that much in terms of 
buying bonds and trying to expand 
the money supply and stimulate the 
economy.
By 1931 the economy was in serious 
trouble. There were three waves of 
bank failures between 1930 and 1932. 
The Fed policymakers were thinking 
that they were providing good liquidity  
to the system. They had cut the discount 
rate, at which the Fed lent to banks, to 
as low as 1 percent. That’s really low, 
historically. Therefore, they concluded 
that they had done what they needed 
to do. But they were not taking into 
account the enormous deflation of the 
time period. 
Carnegie Mellon University Professor  
Allan Meltzer, who has written a multi- 
volume history of the Federal Reserve, 
could not find any evidence that they 
were looking at “real” interest rates  
in the way we think of them today.  
The discount rate might have been  
1 or 2 percent, but the deflation rate  
in the early 1930s was about 8 to  
12 percent. So if I’m a borrower and 
I see a 1 percent interest rate and a 
12 percent deflation rate, that means 
when I pay back the money, I’m paying 
back much more valuable money.  
In purchasing power my interest rate 
would have been 13 percent instead  
of the 1 percent nominal rate. That  
13 percent rate was twice as high as 
any real interest rate we’ve seen since 
the 1930s. 
The first time the Fed made a big pur-
chase of bonds through open market 
operations was in the spring of 1932, 
when they bought about $1 billion over 
several months. That’s like $1 trillion 
today. But the problem was that they 
had already been through a series of 
bank failures before. In their book, 
A Monetary History of the United 
States, Milton Friedman and Anna 
Schwartz described it as acting “too 
little, too late.” The Fed’s leaders were 
in this position where they thought 
they were doing the right thing, but 
the economy was falling apart and the 
money supply was falling and banks 
were failing. 
One of the key problems the Federal 
Reserve leaders faced was that they 
were trying to meet two sets of goals 
that often did not align well. The 
policy makers wanted to focus on the 
U.S. economic problems, but they also 
wanted to help the world maintain  
the gold standard. For example, in 
September and October of 1932,  
the Fed had to worry about a series 
of bank failures at the same time that 
Great Britain left the gold standard 
and all this gold was flowing out of 
the United States. The Fed leaders 
were then between a rock and a hard 
place. They could either buy a bunch 
of bonds to help out the banks in the 
United States, or sell a bunch of bonds 
and prevent the gold from going 
overseas. They decided to focus on 
the international side and prevent the 
gold from going overseas, but this did 
not help the U.S. banks at all. 
Essentially, the Fed from 1930 to 1933  
was like a teenager born in 1913. The 
policymakers were learning on the 
job. They were still trying to figure 
out what to do, then the Depression 
hit. Few of the policymakers had seen 
anything like this set of problems. 
But the Fed finally did change its policy. 
Barry Eichengreen of Cal Berkeley 
and Peter Temin of MIT have both 
written about the change in policy. 
When Roosevelt stepped into office, 
the U.S. went off the gold standard. 
The Roosevelt Administration started 
announcing that its goal was to raise 
prices, and the Fed started to follow a 
more expansionary monetary policy. 
These policies helped shift people’s 
expectations toward inflation rather 
than the extreme deflation that they 
had been experiencing. That helped 
turn the tide.
The speed with which Bernanke  
and [then-Treasury Secretary Hank] 
Paulson responded during this period 
was drastically different than the Fed’s 
response during the Depression.
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Sniderman: You referred to Milton  
Friedman’s research on the Fed’s failure 
to shift policy in the Great Depression. 
On Milton Friedman’s 90th birthday,  
in 2005, Federal Reserve Chairman  
Ben Bernanke in so many words said  
to Milton, sorry about the Great  
Depression, but we won’t do it again.
Fishback: And thank goodness. 
Because when the Fed finally made 
that big open market purchase in 
the 1930s, annual real income had 
dropped by 20 percent, there was a 
nasty deflation, and the unemploy-
ment rate was over 20 percent. That’s 
when they finally made that move. 
Think about the difference: There 
we were in the Depression, and the 
Federal Reserve waited three years 
to make a bold move. Not until the 
unemployment rate was 20 percent 
and annual output had dropped by 
20 percent did they really make a big 
move to purchase bonds. In the recent 
crisis, the unemployment rate at the 
time Bernanke and the Fed started 
the expansion in liquidity hadn’t even 
gotten past 7 percent yet. And real 
output had only been dropping for 
about three quarters. That’s a huge 
difference in responses. 
It’s clear that Bernanke thought that’s 
what needed to be done. And actually 
I believe he was right. In the end, it 
didn’t cost us that much because we 
were backstopping situations and 
did not have to pay out that much, 
although we still don’t know the story 
about Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac. 
The speed with which Bernanke 
and [then-Treasury Secretary Hank] 
Paulson responded during this period 
was drastically different than the Fed’s 
response during the Depression.
Sniderman: Perhaps it’s not surprising 
during periods such as we have now 
when times are tougher, and when we 
see a number of other countries around 
the world emerging and growing at very 
fast rates, that a number of people have 
said that it’s time for the U.S. economy 
to realize that it’s not going to be as pre-
eminent. What would you say to people 
who think we should be scaling back our 
aspirations?
Fishback: I think we should not be 
disheartened. As a matter of fact,  
I’m pretty optimistic. I would bet 
that over the next 50 years, per capita 
income is going to continue to grow 
about 1.6 percent per year; that’s just 
my expectation. 
Here’s why I say that: It’s really easy to 
look around at what you’re seeing and 
the problems—and we’ve had plenty 
of problems in the last three years, 
they just seem to keep coming—and 
be discouraged. Almost anyone you  
can talk to has a litany of things they  
can point to as being a terrible problem  
that is going to prevent the economy 
from growing. But we’ve seen that 
over, and over, and over again in the 
last 200 years. The Club of Rome  
[a global think tank] was talking about 
how the world was going to fall apart 
and run out of all sorts of commodities  
in the 1960s, and then we had a big 
boom in commodities. The reason I 
think this is going on is that we don’t 
know what’s going to come next, 
because there are all sorts of entre-
preneurs out there who are coming 
up with new ideas that you and I and 
most people don’t know about. It’s 
hard to tell which ones will be the 
winners, but there will be winners.
Look at the growth in incomes in 
many developing countries. I am bet-
ting that there will be a huge increase 
in technology change in developing 
countries. As more people have higher 
incomes and better educations in those  
countries, they will be willing to buy 
from us. Not only that, they will be 
developing new products and services 
that we will benefit from. I am very 
optimistic even though I study the 
Great Depression. Well actually, it’s 
probably because I study the Great 
Depression, because it was so bad that 
everything else looks good.
Sniderman: It’s clear from the conversa-
tion that you’re quite passionate about 
economic history.
Fishback: To say the least!
Sniderman: Who were some of your 
mentors in that realm?
Fishback: I was really lucky that I got to 
go to graduate school at the University 
of Washington, where they had five 
economic historians, which is pretty 
unusual. Bob Higgs, Douglass North, 
and Morris D.  Morris all shaped the 
way I think about economic history 
in very diverse ways. They created a 
wonderful and challenging environ-
ment. Bob was my thesis advisor and 
a group of us wrote the book Govern-
ment and the American Economy: A 
New History in his honor. 
Milton Friedman certainly had a big 
impact on me. He was just a great 
economist in all sorts of dimensions. 
Certainly a number of colleagues in 
economic history—Claudia Goldin 
at Harvard, she’s just an amazing labor 
historian. John Wallis at Maryland was 
in graduate school with me, and he 
has done great work on the New Deal, 
federalism, and studies of long-term 
changes in the role of government.
The great thing is, when you’re doing 
research and teaching and reading the 
work of my colleagues in the profes-
sion, there are hundreds of economists 
and economic historians that have 
had influence on what I think. I’m the 
co-editor of the Journal of Economic 
History right now, and every time I get 
a new paper, I get to learn something 
new and it adds to my understanding 
of what’s going on.  ■
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    39 refront FThe summer of 2011 did not inspire much confidence 
about the immediate future:
	• Stagnant job growth and lowered GDP numbers,
 •	U.S. debt downgraded after a nasty debt-ceiling battle,
	•  Several eurozone countries in crisis and world financial 
markets roiling,
	•  London burning after deep UK budget cuts that point  
to a growing wealth divide, and 
	•  Back at home, raging tropical storms in the east and 
catastrophic wildfires in the west.
The once-common assumption that living conditions 
and economic opportunities will improve for each new 
generation now seems dubious. It’s depressing stuff with 
no easy solutions. Where to find some inspiration for how 
to move beyond current challenges and plan for a better 
future? British economist Diane Coyle offers some ideas 
on how to get started in her new book, The Economics of 
Enough: How to Run the Economy as if the Future Matters.
Despite what the title might suggest, this book is no  
“eco-screed” that trashes traditional economic thought  
in favor of some rosy, utopian worldview. Far from it:  
the analysis is rigorous and the arguments well informed 
by prior research. In fact, the first half of the book feels  
like a lengthy literature review, and it’s a bit of a slog for  
a non-economist.
But the broad themes the book goes on to explore— 
addressing the challenges of climate change, high debt 
levels, income inequality, and deteriorating social capital, 
all while the economy undergoes technological trans-
formation—are well worth your while. They provide a 
rich context to assess our present troubles and speak to 
realistic ideals for how to face the future.
The critical question posed in this book is what legacy 
we intend to leave behind—what is “enough” for us to 
consume today so that we don’t leave an unsustainable 
burden of environmental, social, and economic debt to 
future generations. Coyle notes that “current and recent 
generations in the rich economies have been living beyond  
their means and will need to correct that by saving more 
and consuming less.” That reality is complicated by what 
she sees as a breakdown of collective trust and a lack of 
effective governance in today’s society. 
The Economics of Enough:  
How to Run the Economy  
as if the Future Matters 
by Diane Coyle  
Princeton University Press 2011
Reviewed by  
Robin Ratliff  
Executive Editor
Book Review
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ment. Coyle dismisses the notion that a conventional focus 
on economic growth should be tossed aside in pursuit of a  
new “happiness” measure, as others have proposed. Indeed,  
research shows that economic growth contributes greatly 
to happiness. “What’s more,” she adds, “poor countries 
in particular need to continue growing to reduce poverty 
and satisfy natural aspirations to reach the living standards 
of the leading economies.” As a result, Coyle insists that 
GDP growth should remain a policy target.
The critical difference in the twenty-first century is how to 
adequately capture the vast changes in economic growth 
brought by improved productivity and technological 
advances. Coyle proposes a wider array of statistics beyond 
GDP and the existing national accounts. These new, 
longer-term measures would track social and economic 
progress, including generational accounting (to capture 
the burden of future pension and welfare obligations), 
comprehensive wealth (to bring the future impacts of  
current policies into decision-making), and productivity in 
services and other intangibles (to better capture their true 
economic value). She acknowledges that these measure-
ment changes would take time to gain traction and could 
be especially difficult to develop in poor economies.
Institutions matter as well, as reflected in what Coyle  
defines as the currently dysfunctional U.S. political system.  
She advocates a major restructuring of the public sector  
in line with changes that have already been integrated into 
the private sector.
International economic institu tions could also bear some 
major reforming to “embrace a public service mission, 
openness, and greater direct engagement with the members 
of the public whose lives they will ultimately affect.” Of 
course, putting the necessary resources and political will 
behind these sweeping changes would be a mammoth task. 
Another daunting challenge is the current extremes of 
income inequality, which have destabilized large swaths of 
the globe and are undermining the foundations of future 
economic dynamism. Coyle advocates attacking this prob-
lem through legal and regulatory structures. She suggests 
using the tax system to drive out excessive bonuses and 
performance pay, and she takes a pretty hard stab at what 
she sees as paltry reforms in the banking industry following  
the financial crisis, calling for the breakup of big banks. 
What her analysis lacks, though, is the obvious need for 
lower-skilled workers to increase their levels of education 
and training to compete in today’s high-tech workplace.
Coyle also calls for savings incentives to spur economic 
growth. Some of these are happening already—such as 
making people opt out of, rather than opt into, retirement 
savings plans. Replacing the progressive income tax with 
a consumption tax would discourage excessive spending, 
she says, and could also discourage the use of high-carbon 
products and services. Interestingly, where the consumption  
tax was once championed mostly by commentators on 
the right side of the political spectrum, it is now being 
considered by the left as a way to halt over-consumption 
of scarce resources. Businesses, too, would need to change 
their perspectives, adopting a longer time horizon than 
the traditional two-year investment cycle.
Cuts in entitlement spending are inevitable to halt insur-
mountable debt burdens, and they are bound to be painful.  
Coyle suggests engaging citizens more directly in public 
policy through the internet to improve “transparency and  
legitimacy in decision-making and offer a defense of policy  
decisions against lobbying and legal gaming.”
Still, tough changes that include longer work horizons, 
less time off, and reduced pensions will become a reality. 
Those changes are made even tougher by what Coyle 
perceives as a lack of collective trust that we can actually 
harness the measures, values, and institutions we need to 
avoid ripping apart the social capital that holds society 
together. 
If market capitalism is to deliver social well-being that 
speaks to the welfare of future generations, the most  
important ingredient will be the attitudes of individuals.  
I am reminded of President John F. Kennedy’s remarks to 
the students at American University in June 1963, just a 
few months before his death: “Our most basic common 
link is that we all inhabit this small planet. We all breathe 
the same air. We all cherish our children’s future. And we 
are all mortal.” 
While idealistic in its scope, Diane Coyle’s book helps us 
think about some specific ways to make “the economics  
of enough” work for both today and tomorrow.  ■
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